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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY - WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION - LoNGSHOREMEN's AcT
STATUS OF WORKER ON VESSEL WITHDRAWN FROM NAVIGATION BUT
MovING ON NAVIGABLE WATERS - Plaintiff and five others were hired
to load a lake freighter with cargo for winter storage. They were hired by
the day and none lived aboard the vessel, which had been out of commission
for a year. Plaintiff assisted in towing the vessel to the elevator dock and
worked on deck while the cargo was being loaded. While shifting the vessel
along the dock, plaintiff's hand was crushed in a winch. Plaintiff brought an
action at law under the Jones Act.1 Held, plaintiff is not a seaman within the
terms of that act, nor "a member of a crew" so as to preclude recovery under the
Longshoremen's Act. Hawn v . ./lmerican S.S. Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 107
F. (2d) 999.
The legal status of "amphibious" workers injured on navigable waters has
been a troublesome question in maritime litigation. 2 Before the Jorres Act in
1920 the longshoreman had his tort remedy in admiralty against the ship or
its owner for an injury received on board a vessel in navigable waters and caused
by negligence. 3 However, in 1926, by judicial interpretation of the Jones Act,
longshoremen were held to be seamen 4 entitled to elect an action at law 5 or in
admiralty 6 against the employer. Furthermore, these same longshoremen had
been excluded from state' compensation benefits by Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen.1 Then, in 1927, Congress gave longshoremen engaged in other than
local activity a remedy under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. 8
The approach of the courts changed so as to accord with the Longshoremen's
Act. Thus, where the longshoremen and stevedores had formerly been termed
seamen to grant them the coverage of the Jones Act, the courts now held that
these amphibious employees were excluded from that act and included in the
Longshoremen's Act. 9 '.Following a group of decisions construing this part of the
1

41 Stat. L. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S. C. (1934), § 688.
Athearn, "The Longshoremen's Act and the Courts," 23 CAL. L. REV. 129
at 138 (1935). "A!11phibious workers" includes those longshoremen and harborworkers who work partly on land and partly on vessels on navigable waters.
3
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524 (1917); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S. Ct. 438 (1920).
4
International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, 47 S. Ct. 19 (1926).
Also, McCahan Sugar Refining & Molasses Co. v. Stoffel, (C. C. A. 3d, 1930) 41 F.
(2d) 651.
5
Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 44 S. Ct. 391 (1924).
6
Plamals v. Pinar del Rio, 277 U.S. 151, 48 S. Ct. 457 (1928).
1
244 U.S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524 (1917).
8
44 Stat. L. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. (1934), § 903.
9
Originally the Longshoremen's Act was intended to cover all maritime workers.
After strong protests of the seamen's unions, the exception of crew and master was made
to leave to them their maritime remedies of indemnity and maintenance, cure and
wages. Therefore, the act should be construed as covering all maritime workers not in
the meaning of the exception. See Athearn, "The Longshoremen's Act and the
2
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act,10 the court in the principal case had no trouble in holding that the plaintiff
was not a "member of a crew." These decisions have established a general rule
that where the worker's principal duties are of a non-seafaring nature, additional
duties of a seamanlike nature 11 will be regarded as "incidental" and insufficient
to place him in the class of "a member of a crew." 12 The plaintiff's relation
to the vessel in the principal case was primarily that of a harborworker engaged
in non-maritime employment on navigable waters, viz., loading a boat withdrawn from maritime service. The court's holding decided that plaintiff's status
was (1) not that of "a member of a crew," since there was no crew, and (2)
not that of a seaman since the decision denied him an action under the Jones
Courts," 23 CAL. L. REv. 129 at 137 (1935). Dewald v. Baltimore & 0. R. R.,
(C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 810, is an example of the courts' change in attitude.
Decedent's duties as sole man on the barge were to supervise loading and unloading of
the barge and to make trips on it around the harbor. His work in pumping the barge,
handling lines, and tying up the barge alongside other boats was said to be incidental
to his main employment. Under the Jones Act alone, the court would probably have
taken a different approach so as to find him a seaman under that act. In The Herdis,
(D. C. Md. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 304, the libelants were watchmen on vessels moored
in the harbor and temporarily out of commission. They claimed wage liens under the
Ship Mortgage Act, 41 Stat. L. 1004 (1920), 46 U.S. C. (1934), § 953. The court,
in a well written opinion, held libelants to be members of a crew performing maritime
duties on a vessel in navigation. This case is significant in contrast with cases under the
Longshoremen's Act, as showing the liberal constructions of these remedial statutes.
In the case of South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 104
F. (2d) 522, deceased worked on a coal boat operating on the Calumet River, but lived
ashore as the vessel had no sleeping or eating accommodations. His duties were general
labor on board, painting, cleaning, and loading coal onto boats in the river. The court
said, at p. 528: "It was an ordinary laborer's job and it was merely happenstance that
the location of this position was on shipboard." This discussion of decedent's duties
shows the inclination to exclude a deckhand or a part-time worker on these local vessels
from the category of "a member of a crew."
10
"No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of (1)
a master or member of a crew of any vessel. • ••" Longshoremen's Act, 44 Stat. L.
1426 (1927), 33 U.S. C. (1934), § 903. See South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v.
Bassett, (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 522 at 526-528, notes 5 and 6, for an
exhaustive list of cases on this and other clauses of the Longshoremen's Act.
11 Tending lines, pumping boat, moving ship around harbor, or riding on a tow
are considered seamanlike duties.
12 When the "incidental" duties are sufficient to become dominant is not clear.
The courts do not regard as conclusive the fact that the plaintiff ( l) spends all or most
of his time on board ship--Moore Dry Dock v. Pillsbury, (C. C. A. 9th, 1938)
100 F. (2d) 245; Kraft v. Bull S.S. Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 437; (2)
eats and sleeps on board-Antus v. Interocean S. S. Co., (D. C. Ohio, 1938) 1939
Am. Mar. Cas. 617; Diomede v. Lowe, (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 296; (3) is
doin~ work necessary for and in anticipation of becoming a member of the crew on
the next voyage--Antus v. Interocean S. S. Co., supra; Pryce v. U. S. Steel Products
Co., (Fed. Comp. Comm.) 1939 Am. Mar. Cas. II8o; Taylor v. McManigal,
(C. C. A. 6th, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 583, 1937 Am. Mar. Cas. 722; contra: Jones v.
Shepherd, (D. C. Miss. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 345; or (4) makes trips outside the harbor
-Diomede v. Lowe, supra.
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Act. The court had strong authority for holding the ship was without a crew ls
and all that remained was to call the plaintiff a harborworker. The court
expressed a dictum that plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the Longshoremen's Act.14 But the possibility of plaintiff being excluded from recovery under
that act because of an applicable state compensation law 15 was not discussed.
Under the doctrine of Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. 'lJ. Rohde,16 the state compensation law could well apply in the principal case even though the vessel was
on navigable waters, because the plaintiff was engaged in a non-maritime employment, the ship was withdrawn from navigation, and his employment was of
''local concern" with no direct relation to navigation and commerce. However,
it has been suggested that only one test is needed to determine the existence of
federal jurisdiction to the exclusion of state compensation laws, i.e., whether
there is a close relationship between the employment and navigation and commerce in general upon navigable waters.17 The freighter in the principal case
had been withdrawn from navigation 18 for over a year and the work being
done was not in anticipation of, nor necessary for, any voyage. Therefore, any
close relation between the work and navigation in general is missing and the
state compensation law could have been applied. ,
13
An analogous and stronger case is Antus v. Interocean S. S. Co., (D. C. Ohio,
1938) 1939 Am. Mar. Cas. 617, where a seaman from the previous voyage had been
hired to remain on the vessel while it was laid up for winter to assist in loading grain
for winter storage. Held, not a member of the crew. In Moore Dry Dock Co. v. Pillsbury, (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 100 F. (2d) 245, a rigger at a shipyard who spent most
of his time on a small tug was held not to be a member of a crew. The court said the
act meant to except "only those • • • ordinarily and generally considered as seafaring
men."
14
107 F. (2d) 999 at 1000: "If not [a member of the crew], he was limited to
compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act."
15
"(a) Compensation shall be payable •.• only .•• if recovery ••• through
workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state law." 44
Stat. L. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S. C. (1934), § 903.
16
257 U. S. 469, 42 S. Ct. 157 (1923). The courts held a non-maritime employee injured on navigable waters to be compensable under a state compensation law.
See Longshoremen's Act, Opinion No. 30, (Fed. Comp. Comm.) 1928 Am. Mar.
Cas. 417; United States Casualty Co. v. Taylor, (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 521
(Oregon compensation law held applicable to an injury received on a launched but
uncompleted ship). See Athearn, "The Longshoremen's. Act and the Courts," 23
CAL. L. REV. 129 at 134 (1935), for a discussion of the problem and collected cases
where state acts have been held applicable or inapplicable. See also Stumberg, "Harbor
Workers and Workmen's Compensation," 7 TEX. L. REV. 197 at 210 (1929).
17
Morrison, "Workmen's Compensation and Maritime Law," 38 YALE L. J.
472 at 498 (1929).
18 There is a question whether the towing of the vessel to the dock and warping
it back and forth will justify a holding that the ship was in navigation and that ergo a
relationship between navigation and the plaintiff's' employment existed. The case of
The Herdis, (D. C. Md. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 304, cited three situations in which a
boat had been held to be in navigation: (1) boat temporarily at anchor; (2) boat in
repair; (3) boat being moved for purposes of profit. However, the court held that a
vessel cannot be regarded as being in navigation where it is laid up for any considerable
length of time and cannot reasonably be said to be employed in navigation.

